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Latin America has received little political attention since the end of the Cold War. This 
is also reflected in German foreign policy as German legislators and members of the 
German government have spent only limited time on Latin American issues over the 
past years. While international “hot spots” like Iran, Iraq, China and India dominate the 
agenda of the Bundestag or the meetings of the standing committee on foreign affairs, 
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Latin America is usually only a fringe topic, reduced to short reports by an official from 
the foreign ministry and rarely among the speaking points of a state secretary. Of course, 
exceptions are made in cases of urgency as faced during the days of tension between 
Colombia and Ecuador after the capturing of FARC-leaders on Ecuadorian soil by the 
Colombian military. 
The German political influence in Latin America is limited. But while relations with 
that region have become of lesser priority, Latin America has by no means sunk into 
political insignificance for either Germany or the European Union.2 The Federal Foreign 
Office, for example, notes that Germany has closer historical and cultural links with the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean than with any other region outside the 
European Union (EU) and North America.3 This is politically reflected in the negotia-
tions which have been underway since 1999 between the EU and the Mercado Común 
del Sur (Mercosur) on an association agreement, while negotiations on an extended co-
operation agreement with the Andean countries and Central America have been ongoing 
since 2003.4
Intensified cooperation between the two regions would seem all the more pressing in 
light of the fact that the USA has in recent years and decades neglected what it considers 
its own “backyard”. US President Nixon said as early as 1971: “Latin America doesn’t 
matter […], people don’t give one damn about Latin America now.”5 Little has changed 
in this attitude since that time. With regard to Latin America, US-politicians are pre-
occupied with the communist leadership in Havana and Venezuela’s president, Hugo 
Chavez, whose behaviour towards Washington is generally thoroughly undiplomatic. 
Latin America is showing a growing desire to liberate itself from Washington, which 
offers new possibilities for emancipation and intensified cooperation between Latin 
America and the EU. 
It is thus high time that Germany and the EU start reconsidering their engagement with 
and within Latin America. At this appropriate point in time, the two major German 
political parties, the SPD and CDU/CSU each organised conferences in 2008 with high-
level speakers from Latin America and presented policy papers that contributed to one of 
the rare debates about Latin America on the parliamentary floor, on the occasion of the 
EU-Latin America summit in Lima in 2008 – a debate which came as a surprise even to 
parliamentarians themselves. 
This paper comes to offer some insights into parliamentary procedures on policy-making 
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influence. It outlines fields of intensified future cooperation between Europe and Latin 
America based on an analysis of German and European interests in the region in the light 
of recent political and social developments in the countries of the subcontinent. The 
author proposes a future policy approach to the region as a whole, reflecting his personal 
experience and convictions as a social democratic member of the German Bundestag. 
2. Recent political developments in contemporary Latin America 
Latin America cannot, of course, be viewed as a homogenous political unit, since it 
is characterised by considerable differences. Wolf Grabendorff, in his analysis for the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, calls the Panama Canal a “geopolitical border”. He catego-
rises Central America and the Caribbean as part of the “North American community”, 
while he sees the emergence of a new regional subsystem in South America.6 Other 
authors distinguish between the Mercosur countries on the one hand, which they regard 
as relatively safe and stable, and the countries stretching from the Caribbean via Central 
America to the Andes on the other hand, which they classify as being more unstable. The 
internal security of these states is compromised by criminal gangs, internal conflicts and 
protests on the part of indigenous sections of the population.7 The issue of insecurity is 
becoming a main concern for Latin American voters with a major influence on the po-
litical discourse of many countries, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
Another possible distinction can be made by positioning the governments on a right-
left axis. There are liberal democracies such as Costa Rica, as well as countries which are 
governed by the so-called “New Left”. These include Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador.8 
Notwithstanding the fact that they share the same basically critical attitude towards glo-
balisation and liberalisation, it would however be wrong to regard the “New Left” as a 
homogenous group. The label hides a range of highly diverse and, in terms of political 
programmes, heterogeneous groupings with great differences in their long-term objec-
tives, ideological orientation and their entrenchment in society. Parallel to this develop-
ment, the traditional party landscapes are being progressively eroded and new political 
forces are emerging in the form of heterogeneous alliances of different groups. There is 
also a move away from institutional rules and a shift of democratic processes to areas 
outside the traditional political institutional framework.
Although Latin America may be frequently beset by crises, there are nevertheless a num-
ber of positive features which need to be emphasised. The region is to all intents and 







52 | Niels Annen
zone and has no biological or chemical weapons. Most countries have signed disarma-
ment and non-proliferation treaties.9 In 1994, Brazil officially renounced its ambitions 
to become a nuclear weapons state.10 Latin America is also the only region in the world 
to have escaped attacks by international terrorists after 11 September 2001. While there 
is speculation that Islamist terror groups may be operating in the virgin forests in the 
triangle of land between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay which is difficult to police, there 
is no pertinent evidence to substantiate this.11
Since the settlement of the conflict in Central America, the subcontinent can generally 
be regarded as a zone of peace which shows little conflictivity. There have been no violent 
transnational conflicts since that time,12 although the sabre-rattling between Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela in March 2008 caused concern for a short time until the Organi-
sation of American States (OAS) stepped in to mediate.
During the 1980s, the remaining Latin American countries found their way back from 
military dictatorship to democracy by their own efforts. In Chile, Augusto Pinochet 
was defeated in a plebiscite; Argentina brought its dictators to trial; and in Guatemala 
the military governments, which had pursued a strategy almost akin to genocide on the 
indigenous population, were overthrown, to be replaced in a process of democratisation. 
In Nicaragua and El Salvador, also long torn by civil war, a peace process has successfully 
been implemented.
Compared with other regions of the developing or newly industrialising world, Latin 
America is by far the most democratic region.13 This is astonishing given the region’s un-
democratic history over long periods of time as well as its economic and social problems. 
Surveys conducted by the Latinobarómetro in 2007 back up this fact impressively with 
a political approval rate of approximately 70 per cent.14 Increased intergovernmental 
cooperation and, associated with this, the creation of intraregional institutions such as 
Mercosur have helped to stabilise democracy.15 In recent years, this has gone hand in 
hand with a strengthening of human rights. Decentralisation, in addition, has given 
citizens far greater opportunities for participation.16 It may still be too early to talk about 
good governance, but at least it is possible to detect better governance.17
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3. Social injustice as a threat to regional security 
Despite many examples of progress in recent years, the majority of Latin America’s gov-
ernments continue to face huge challenges. In many cases, these threaten to overstrain 
the state’s ability to take effective action.
If one looks for example at the national product of these countries, it might appear at 
first that there is no poverty problem. Yet the Gini coefficient, which is a more reliable 
benchmark for measuring poverty, reveals how unequally wealth is distributed. Nowhere 
in the world are assets so unequally distributed and the gap between poor and rich as 
wide as in Latin America.18 According to 2006 figures, 48 per cent of income is in the 
hands of the richest 10 per cent of the population, with only 1.6 per cent in the hands 
of the poorest 10 per cent. Brazil, for example, has a per capita GDP of around 5,200 
US dollars (2006), putting it far ahead of other emerging and developing countries. Its 
Gini coefficient for the same year, on the other hand, was 57.0, one of the worst figures 
by international comparison.19 The comparable ratio in the industrialised countries is 10 
to 29.1 and 10 to 2.5 per cent.20 The poverty rate stands at 40 per cent.21
In contrast to other developing regions in the world, Latin America has had success in 
containing poverty because there is no shortage of wealth as such. Yet there is a lack of 
funds and in many cases a lack of political will to fight for the redistribution which is 
urgently needed for both social and economic reasons. Latin America’s economic elite 
shows no signs even today of being prepared to help bridge the deep social divide. One 
example of this reluctance is what is known as the “financial transaction tax” in Brazil, 
the Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira, introduced in 1994, which 
levies a tax of 0.38 per cent on all bank account transactions. This brought the exchequer 
20 billion US dollars per year for social purposes (health, pensions and social assistance). 
The opposition and elites, however, voted in Brazil’s Senate against extending the tax, 
thereby blocking it.22 
A variety of Latin American governments have, however, made attempts to tackle pov-
erty: In Venezuela and Ecuador, for example, the gas and oil industries have been na-
tionalised and their profits diverted to financial and social assistance programmes for 
the poor and to the development of a rentier economy. These assistance programmes are 
an important feature of Chavez’s socialism. These programmes or “Misiones” primarily 
benefit the poor, who represent the majority of the population. There are now 16 such 
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tro” (Inside the Barrio), for example, is a project set up to establish health care in poor 
neighbourhoods. Initially, doctors and nurses from Cuba were sent into the barrios to 
work. It seems that there are now permanent medical centres in all the barrios. These 
improvements in health care have been made possible by the exchange of oil for medical 
personnel from Cuba.
There are also state-run food shops in Venezuela selling food which is presumably heav-
ily subsidised, although the details are not made known to the public. Customers pay 
around 40 per cent less for food in these establishments than in a private shop. In the 
space of eighteen months, these state-run food shops have grown from nothing to be-
come the country’s largest food chain. The programmes are supplemented by other mea-
sures including literacy campaigns and scholarship schemes for the universities.23 Under 
this policy, the government has been able to reduce the number of households living in 
poverty from 53.1 per cent in 2004 to 36.5 per cent in 2006. The number of households 
living in extreme poverty has fallen from 23.5 to 13.4 per cent.24 In 2006, however, 
poverty stabilised at the 2005 level despite high economic growth and the government’s 
social policy priorities.
At the same time in Brazil, President Lula launched a social programme called “Bolsa 
Familia” which has helped 11.1 million families or 45.9 million people, equivalent to 
roughly one quarter of the country’s entire population. At the moment they receive a 
monthly grant of 62 reais, equivalent to around 23 euro, which is about enough to feed 
a family for a month.25 The Brazilian government has also raised minimum wages; pen-
sions, linked to wages, have consequently also risen. 
It should be noted, however, that while these programmes may cushion poverty, they do 
little to nothing to change structural inequalities in the countries in question. In Brazil, 
voters demonstrated their disappointment with the President for doing less to tackle the 
inequality in the country than they had expected. The landless movement, for example, 
turned away from him. Within his party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the govern-
ment has also come in for some sharp criticism for its policies.
In addition to the uneven distribution of wealth, there are also other qualitative short-
comings within the Latin American democracies. The justice and legal systems are often 
ineffective, resulting in many criminals going unpunished – always supposing they are 
prosecuted in the first place. Coupled with this problem are deficits in the area of internal 
security. Rising crime rates are a central issue in nearly all the countries of Latin America. 
Most of the countries in the region are prey in particular to organised crime and maraud-
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ated a particular furore. The clear-up rate for such cases is extremely low.26 In addition, 
drug trade affecting many countries in the region is a serious problem. In Colombia, 
armed groups such as FARC and the ELN create conflicts which need to be tackled.27
According to polls conducted by the Latinobarómetro, internal security is therefore an 
increasingly important issue for the population, ranking in second place after unemploy-
ment. The increase in the number of times the issue is mentioned is striking. While in 
2003 only 8 per cent of the population regarded crime as their country’s most important 
problem, this figure had risen to 17 per cent by 2007.28 
The issue of guaranteeing internal security is therefore becoming increasingly important 
in domestic politics. When it comes to addressing all these problems by policy measures, 
the state does not always succeed in improving and guaranteeing the population’s secu-
rity or making them feel safe. Governments have frequently squandered the trust placed 
in them through inefficiency, corruption and involvement in criminal structures and by 
committing or covering up human rights violations.29 It is difficult to believe that such 
excesses could exist without corrupt policemen, government officials, judges and func-
tionaries in other state agencies.30 
The complete loss of trust in state agencies and the police has already led in Brazil, for 
example, to the formation of vigilante groups. It coincides with a tendency to privatise 
security: Those who can afford to do so live barricaded against violence and crime. This 
trend creates considerable potential for conflict.31 Non-state security actors are conse-
quently playing an increasingly significant role which can no longer simply be taken 
away from them.32 It has even led in some cases to instances of lynch justice. This is a 
worrying development of which growing militarisation is a part. Due to this, the Brazil-
ian government has already needed to send police units under the control of the military 
to districts where the police had been severely attacked.33
Progressively, therefore the state is experiencing a loss of its monopoly on power.34 This 
is met in some countries by reviving old concepts such as mano dura (Iron Fist). At-
tempts are being made in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras to crack down on crime 
through harsher criminal law and, associated with this, restrictions on civil rights.
All these factors – inadequate attempts to combat poverty, rising crime, the expansion 
of the drugs trade and the involvement of state forces in corruption – are ramping up 
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the region36, as citizens lose faith in state structures. This is also reflected in a huge fall in 
allegiance to parties amongst the electorate.37 
4. Defining shared political interests as a basis for future cooperation
While poverty, poorly functioning justice systems, crime, corruption and dwindling 
trust in democracy in Latin America may not have a direct effect on Germany or the EU, 
they might nevertheless have indirect ramifications for us. Some of the threats that the 
EU identifies in its security strategy (such as regional conflicts, state failure or organised 
crime) can be found on the subcontinent. Latin America may not be affected by Islamist 
terrorism, but organised crime and, in the case of Colombia, paramilitaries and guerrilla 
groups are challenging the state’s monopoly on power. In the context of growing in-
ternational interdependencies, these developments can have repercussions on European 
countries. Europe thus has an interest in tackling these issues early on.
This would also be in line with the wider definition of security which has become preva-
lent in Europe’s foreign and defence policy that aims at overcoming the structural causes 
of conflict such as hunger, poverty and resource management.38 In its final report on 
the summit of the heads of state and government of Europe and Latin America in Gua-
dalajara in 2004, the European Commission therefore highlighted the importance of 
security-related issues in Latin America for the EU member states: 
These relations, which aim at contributing to peace, political stability and economic 
development, are of utmost importance for the European Union. Social and political 
stability in Latin America is vital for global peace and security. The European Union is 
contributing to the creation and consolidation of structural stability in Latin America 
through political dialogue, cooperation and economic relations. The European Union 
is interested in developing a political partnership with Latin America which promotes 
global governance and strengthening multilateralism.39
The social and political challenges that Latin America faces and which are outlined 
above therefore give an idea of future fields of cooperation between the EU and Latin 
America.40 However, they must be congruent with other interests in the region, which 
36	 S.	Haid	/	A.	Ludwig/C.	Rieck/M.	Zarandi,	Sicherheitspolitische	Veränderungen	(note	7),	p.	4.
37	 H.	Barrios,	Partnerregion	Lateinamerika	(note	),	p.	86.
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will therefore be defined below. As European and Latin American interests cannot be 
expected to be naturally identical, they need to be confronted with each other first before 
they can be squared.
4.1 The interests of Germany and the EU in Latin America
Germany’s role in and its relationship with Latin America are different from those of 
Spain, Portugal or the USA. Unlike Spain or Portugal, Germany has never possessed 
colonies in the region. And unlike the USA, Germany has not intervened militarily in 
the region nor shown any imperial attitudes in the past 50 years, which means that there 
is little strain on relations.41 This is one reason for the high regard Germany enjoys in 
Latin America.42 However, relations between Germany and Latin America also go back 
a long way. Trade relations began as early as the sixteenth century and have remained 
important ever since. Generally, Germany’s interests in Latin American might not always 
be identical with those of Spain or Portugal, but due to the European integration process 
there still is wide field of overlapping interests.
A central point of interest is the regional integration of the subcontinent.43 It is in the 
interests of Germany and the EU to enhance Latin America’s regional integration as a 
means of facilitating cooperation and trade with the region.44 Despite all the current 
difficulties, the EU can serve as a successful model for Latin America. The European eco-
nomic and social model, with its ideas of equal opportunities and solidarity, continues to 
be attractive to Latin America in the context of rectifying structural asymmetries.
Germany and the EU have an interest in cooperating more closely with Latin America 
in international politics. The countries of the region, like the EU, favour a multilateral 
approach to foreign and security policy. They could therefore be a valuable partner in 
strengthening multilateralism.45
In addition, Germany and the EU rely on Latin America’s support in the struggle against 
international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The region 
is already a nuclear-weapons-free zone and also has many years’ experience in interna-
tional disarmament talks and in implementing inspection regimes.46 Europe can benefit 
from this knowledge and should exploit it in current negotiations rather than leaving it 
unused. Likewise, cooperation with Latin America also needs to be expanded in the area 
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The region, with its many hectares of rainforest, also plays a very important role in 
environmental protection. Promoting sustainable development, particularly involving 
technology transfer, is important in this context.48
Europe also regards strengthening civil society structures in the countries of Latin Ame-
rican to be of central importance, coupled with development cooperation, as well as the 
promotion of democracy and upholding of human rights. Strengthening civil society is 
vital to the process of stabilising the Latin American democracies. Citizens need more 
and, above all, more efficient possibilities for becoming involved in politics. They need 
this not least to regain their lost trust in state institutions. A strong civil society is a basic 
prerequisite for creating a society built on the principle of solidarity which in turn offers 
the basis for more trade and investment.49 Social cohesion can be strengthened by wor-
king purposefully to abolish social inequalities.
In addition to this, there is a vital European interest in establishing societal as well as 
internal security.50 In its security strategy, the EU highlights the need to tackle dangers 
at their source. It is therefore hugely important to the countries of Europe for corrupti-
on, lawlessness, the drugs trade and organised crime to be contained and for weak state 
institutions to be supported on the road to good governance.
The European Commission would like to support primarily those countries which can 
and want to contribute to stability and prosperity in Latin America.51 One cannot, ho-
wever, leave the issue un-addressed of how to define relations with the states in the region 
and with the parties and movements of the New Left which want to tread a different 
and potentially problematic path. Ideas for this dilemma will be offered in part 5 of this 
paper.
4.2 Latin American interests in Europe
Once again, it must be stressed that the countries of the region do not form a homoge-
nous group. But when talking as a politician with parliamentarians in the region, it is 
possible to identify certain common trends. All the governments and countries in the 
region are anxious that Latin America should receive more attention from Germany and 
the EU. All countries are also interested in improving contacts on all levels. Against this 
background the trips made by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Federal 
Chancellor Angela Merkel through Latin America are very much welcomed in Latin 
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The region naturally has an interest in cooperating closely with the EU and benefiting 
from its experiences in the area of integration. However, Brazil exemplifies the internal 
divisions of the region. The growing importance of Brazil is shown, inter alia, by its in-
volvement with India and Germany in the joint initiative to reform the United Nations. 
Brazil also performs an important bridging function as an intermediary between Ger-
many / the EU and countries such as Venezuela. Brazil is striving for a strong partnership 
with the EU.52 South America’s giant, however, has yet to find its role: Sao Paulo wants 
to be seen as an advocate for the interests of the Third World, which has the unwanted 
consequence of distancing it from the industrialised countries. The country is also, on 
the other hand, seeking to move closer to the leading industrial nations. Thus Brazil’s 
views and ideas are in clear contrast to those of some other Latin American countries 
which want to revive the outdated Third World orientation of the sixties and seventies 
of the 20th century.53 
At the same time the member states of Mercosur are looking inwards and striving not 
only to establish a free trade area, but also to create a community of values similar to 
the EU. This is demonstrated, for example, by the inclusion in the Mercosur Treaty of 
a clause on democracy which is designed to prevent any member state from backsliding 
into autocracy.
4.3 Shared interests 
So Latin America and Germany / the EU do share common interests. The fact that they 
hold congruent ideas in relation to the multilateral shaping of international relations is a 
good lever for intensified cooperation.
Mention has already been made of the joint initiative undertaken by Brazil and Germany 
together with Japan and South Africa to reform the United Nations (UN). Beyond this, 
there are other common goals which Germany/the EU and the Latin American countries 
are pursuing in international politics. Both sides want to see progress in strengthen-
ing multilateral organisations and effective structures of global governance.54 Both sides 
share a will to work together to counter global security risks.
A comparison of the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2001 declaration of the 
heads of state and government of the Organisation of American States (OAS) immedi-
ately reveals a number of significant similarities:
–   Both organisations share the same view on the conditions needed to create security. 
These include in particular a basic democratic orientation, highlighting the impor-
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conflicts, respect for human rights, solidarity and cooperation and respect for national 
sovereignty;
–   Both seek security cooperation on the basis of particular values such as democracy, 
justice and respect for international law. Both the OAS and the EU believe that the 
UN is of crucial importance in this respect; 
–   Both partners advocate a multilateralist approach to settling international conflicts 
and believe that crises and conflicts should wherever possible be pre-empted by com-
prehensive prevention.55 
Latin America and Germany / the EU in addition share a series of political and cultural 
values.56 As already mentioned most Latin American countries have signed non-prolif-
eration and disarmament treaties and argue for transparency and also a decrease in arms 
spending. In terms of non-proliferation and disarmament, the EU and Latin America 
share the same goals. Both regions are committed to fighting international terrorism.57 
Both the EU and Latin America are calling for better environmental protection. They be-
lieve that environmentally compatible and sustainable development can actually increase 
rather than hamper the competitiveness of countries.58 
Regional integration is a further shared interest which, while it does not have a direct 
bearing on international relations, is important “only” for respective intra-regional rela-
tions. In order to achieve a more influential position in international politics, the Latin 
American countries, like the EU, want to cooperate more closely with each other poli-
tically and economically.59 Only Mercosur, however, can be regarded as an effective as-
sociation of states in the region. The other intraregional associations such as the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) and the Central American Integration System 
(MCCA / SICA) or the Andean Community (CAN) are weak and do not appear to have 
a viable future.
5. Fields of future cooperation – a social democrat’s view
Cooperation with Latin American states and political parties in the region has a long 
tradition in Germany. The nature and focus points of this cooperation must be seen not 
only in the light of geographic and economic factors; they can only be understood when 
taking party-political ideologies and agendas into consideration. The long-standing rela-
tionship between German social democracy and Latin America is one of solidarity with 
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Many of these parties joined the global umbrella organisation “Socialist International” 
which the German SPD has been a leading member of. Under the long and influential 
SI-presidency of Willy Brandt who played a key role in promoting the idea of Nor-
th-South-Cooperation, the SPD as a party and SPD politicians individually developed 
strong and trustful relations with political actors from Latin America. These relations 
were maintained even in times of crisis or of military dictatorship from which many 
countries of the region suffered. During those years, the network of world-wide offices of 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation was an instrumental backbone for supporting befriended 
movements and parties in Latin America. Likewise, organisations such as the Young 
Socialists (Jusos) and the Socialist Youth / The Falcons had their share in developing per-
sonal relations, offering training as well as political and mental support to their partners. 
Many of today’s active social democratic politicians derive their interest in international 
politics generally and in Latin America specifically from their personal experience with 
that solidarity movement and from youth exchanges with the region. 
However, contemporary cooperation with Latin America is a specific challenge for social 
democrats because the party-political landscape has altered dramatically in recent years. 
Many of the traditional social democratic parties and member parties of the Socialist In-
ternational are weakened or have been swept from the stage completely, so links have be-
come looser.60 New parties and movements such as the PT in Brazil or Mas (Movimiento 
al Socialismo) in Bolivia have been created. Nevertheless, supporting and advising parties 
and movements of both the New and the Old Left, i.e. the “progressive parties”, is and 
remains a key element of the work of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Latin America 
in relation to promoting democracy through social democracy. 
One needs to bear in mind, however, that parliamentary influence in strengthening this 
cooperation is limited because the leading role in the field of international politics falls 
to the government and its respective ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Economics etc. But instead of complaining about limitations on one’s 
influence or even blocking initiatives, both the executive and the legislative power should 
become more aware of the advantages that can go along with this division of powers and 
competences. While ministries usually follow and implement strict medium and long-
term agendas, parliamentarians are not bound by a hierarchical bureaucracy. They can 
act and react individually and can often react faster to developments, and they can rely 
on individual relations that have been developed over years and decades of personal in-
teraction with actors from the region. They can lobby within their parliamentary groups 
to table at short notice issues on the agenda of caucus groups or committees which they 
deem relevant and thereby turn them into an issue of public debate. This, however, also 
shows the volatility of parliamentary power and influence because much of it comes and 
goes with the enthusiasm and personal engagement of individual parliamentarians.
60	 D.	Wollrad,	Pink	Tide	–	Was	passiert	in	Lateinamerika,	Internes	Thesenpapier	der	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,	Berlin	
006,	S.	5.
2 | Niels Annen
Due to the clearly defined competences of committees which often go along with very 
different perspectives on one and the same policy matter, even the parliamentary ap-
proach to cooperation with Latin American faces limitations and challenges. One ex-
ample of this is reflected in the process that the policy-papers on Latin America intro-
duced by the Grand Coalition of SPD and CDU / CSU in 2008 mentioned above went 
through. This began as an initiative towards an all-encompassing strategy towards Latin 
America, and it was not surprising to discover that social democrats and conservatives 
took very different positions regarding new political and popular movements in Latin 
America. While not necessarily agreeing with measures taken by the governments of 
Bolivia or Venezuela, for example, SPD representatives favoured a certain openness and 
channels of communication – something which was not seen in a positive light by the 
coalition partners. Likewise, the need to regulate globalisation for the common good 
was not given the same priority among members of the CDU / CSU as within the ranks 
of the SPD representatives. Even more surprising, however, was a parallel development 
which took place regardless of political affiliations between the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on the one hand and the Committees on Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment on the other hand. Whereas the Committee on Foreign Affairs emphasised the 
future of bilateral relations and of fields of cooperation, the latter – due to the nature of 
the development policy field – focussed on demands from the European governments 
and institutions. Finally, this resulted in two separate resolutions in parliament by the 
Grand Coalition: one by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and one by the Committee 
on Economic Cooperation and Development.61 This is a particular demonstration of the 
particular difficulties in streamlining policy approaches with different addressees in our 
political system. Having said that, it is of course absolutely necessary for both the execu-
tive and the legislative branch to make an effort to combine those different policy angles 
if future cooperation with Latin America is to become sustainable and effective.
Turning now to the concrete fields of future cooperation with Latin America, the fol-
lowing should be noted. Generally, bilateral cooperation with individual countries, but 
also with the region as a whole, is potentially highly efficient and improves perceptions 
and mutual understanding. However, because of Brazil’s international standing and its 
above-mentioned bridging function, strategic cooperation with the country should be a 
high priority. It would be desirable to make efforts to enable Brazil to join the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Together we can use our 
potential to make globalisation fairer and more social and to resolve global problems. The 
regions also have a shared responsibility at international level, particularly in the United 
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Beyond that, there are four areas which cooperation between the EU and Latin America 
should focus on, which will be outlined below.
5.1 Security policy cooperation
Going hand in hand with the problem of social inequality, the security situation com-
bined with the drugs trade is among the region’s most pressing problems. Some gov-
ernments have tried – as mentioned above – to introduce tougher penalties to combat 
the problem, but their efforts are generally regarded as counterproductive.62 Concepts 
such as mesas de seguridad in Honduras, frentes de seguridad and pactos de convivencia y 
seguridad in Colombia or consejos comunales in Venezuela would appear to hold more 
promise. All these are schemes in which citizens, i.e. civil society, work together with the 
police and/or exercise oversight over them. Particularly against the historical background 
of Latin America, I believe that this type of cooperation is particularly worth support-
ing. Governments which have not introduced similar measures to build confidence in 
the police and justice system should be encouraged to follow the lead taken by their 
neighbours.
It is vital, however, for countries in the region to act decisively against the causes of 
crime, taking proactive steps to tackle a lack of prospects, poverty and social inequality. 
Germany and the EU can provide support here through development cooperation, pro-
viding cooperation is understood to be between equals.
Fighting poverty is therefore central to the security policy partnership. If successes are 
not achieved soon and if the upper echelons in Latin America are not prepared to make 
an appropriate financial contribution, the entire region risks sliding into a vicious circle 
of instability. Unless progress is made in mitigating the huge social discrepancies in the 
region, it will be extremely difficult to effectively stabilise Latin America socially and 
politically.63
In the context of traditional commonalities in security policy, cooperation with respect 
to non-proliferation is an obvious approach. Both Latin America and Europe regard pro-
liferation as a threat to security and are calling strongly for disarmament and arms con-
trol. For the same reasons we should cooperate with Latin America in the fight against 
international terrorism.
In the future, more reliance should be placed in the context of tackling international 
crises on cooperation between Germany and the EU on the one side and Latin America 
on the other. Both share common values and have been acting in the framework of in-
ternational bodies and organisations as has been shown above. 
6	 P.	Peetz,	Innere	Sicherheit	in	Lateinamerika	–	Probleme	und	Perspektiven	(note	8),	p.	5.
63	 S.	Haid	/	A.	Ludwig	/	C.	Rieck	/	M.	Zarandi,	Sicherheitspolitische	Veränderungen	(note	7),	p.	5.
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5.2 Promoting democracy, the rule of law and sustainable development
Promoting democracy and the rule of law is very closely linked to the security issue. The 
EU is conducting a political dialogue with Latin America in this respect on three levels: 
regional, sub-regional and with individual countries. It is also talking to representatives 
of civil society in order to strengthen the latter, but is engaging equally with state actors 
in order to encourage them to cooperate more closely with civil society.64 
Abolishing extreme social inequalities is pivotal, as has already been said, to bringing 
about effective democratisation and state modernisation.65 In order to achieve this goal, 
the EU must review and broaden its concept of solidarity with respect to Latin America. 
Solidarity includes not only the upholding of human rights and democracy but also the 
formulation of fair trade strategies.
It is inadequate for the European side to insist on adherence to labour and environmental 
standards while at the same time refusing to liberalise areas of trade such as agriculture 
which are vital to creating prosperity in many Latin American countries.66 Without a fair 
world trade system it will be virtually impossible to bring about a sustainable develop-
ment in which all the citizens of Latin America can be involved. This involvement in turn 
makes democratic stabilisation and good governance significantly more probable.67 
We also need to review our definition of development to make it more than simply a 
matter of raising per capita income. The disadvantaged population groups and in par-
ticular the indigenous peoples must be encouraged to assert their interests. Many of 
them have organised themselves, in order to define and ultimately also to articulate their 
interests. This is a necessary process even if it leads to a certain degree of social conflict in 
Latin America. If it does not happen, the region runs the risk of doing lasting harm to its 
social capital.68 In contrast to the USA, the efforts made by the EU and Germany to pro-
mote democracy concentrate on supporting civil society. The advantage of this approach 
is that security consequently comes to be regarded as a societal construction.69
Jörg Faust recommends that Germany and Europe should promote democracies and 
suggests that the first step should be to forge relations with democratic countries in the 
region.70 I firmly believe this to be the wrong and too narrow an approach. It is wrong 
for those who wish to promote democracy to focus one-sidedly on those countries which 
are regarded as models in this area. Germany should negotiate with all Latin American 
countries instead of making a distinction between “good democrats” and “bad popu-
lists”. The only way of establishing trust is through meeting and talking with people on 
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rapprochement and also change. If we treat states such as Venezuela only with disdain, 
they are likely to seal themselves off and, if in doubt, turn more decisively to autocratic 
structures. 
Offering talks, on the other hand, does not mean paying court to populist trends or ac-
cepting them unchallenged. It is essential always to remember that these governments 
were democratically elected and legitimised. If we want to prevent a growing polarisation 
in Latin America, we must develop an active diplomacy with respect to those countries 
which are currently ruled by populist governments.
There is a need, therefore, to integrate countries such as Venezuela and back Brazil’s strat-
egy to increase integration. If we want to understand what is happening in Venezuela at 
this time, we must also, however, seek dialogue with Chavez’s party Movimiento Quinta 
República (MVR) in order to try to work with democratic forces within the MVR to 
develop alternatives to Chavez’s policy. The “no” vote to constitutional reforms indicates 
there may be scope here.71
A strong, firmly rooted and self-confident democracy always also includes the protection 
of minorities. We must consequently also exert pressure to strengthen the rights of in-
digenous sections of the population in Latin America. Although the indigenous peoples 
represent the majority of inhabitants in some countries in the region, they have long 
been oppressed and disadvantaged by the ruling minority. While a number of countries 
may have taken steps to address this problem, it is not possible to talk of across-the-board 
improvements, even following the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia as the region’s first 
indigenous president.72
5.3 Environmental protection
The consequences of climate change are affecting the entire globe. It is essential there-
fore for the international community to work together to tackle the problems. Latin 
America with its vast areas of rainforest (23 per cent of the world’s trees and 46 per cent 
of the world’s tropical rainforests are located in the region)73 has a prominent role to 
play here. Logging has a negative effect not only on local populations but on the whole 
world. There is a need to share energy-saving technologies in order to reconcile increas-
ing growth on the subcontinent and sustainable development.74 There is huge potential 
for scientific and economic cooperation in this area, particularly for Germany which 
leads the world in technologies for regenerative energy use. 
Effective environmental protection will be almost impossible to achieve without preserv-
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gion’s support for the agreement on biological diversity and the Kyoto Protocol is there-
fore to be welcomed.75 The measures, initiatives and draft regulations proposed within 
the post-Kyoto process must be agreed with Latin America at an early stage. Numerous 
agreements on fundamental positions emerged from the Climate Conference in Bali. 
These include in particular questions of energy consumption, the expansion of renew-
able energies as well as joint efforts to preserve air and water quality and forests. The fact 
that the countries of Latin America are already signatories to central UN conventions on 
environmental protection further advances future cooperation in this field.
5.4 Regional integration
Latin America has made impressive efforts to strengthen regional cooperation; this is 
especially true for Mercosur. These efforts deserve our support, particularly since they 
open up new possibilities of cooperation between Germany, the EU and Latin America. 
We Europeans should use the experience and knowledge we have gained in this respect 
to drive forward the conclusion of bi-regional agreements between Mercosur and the 
EU.76 The experience with European integration is widely perceived as one that gives us 
the necessary expertise to take on a leading role in the promotion of sub-regional and 
regional integration approaches. In terms of Latin America there is particular scope to 
promote institutionalised cooperation at sub-regional level.77 
One good way of offering incentives for greater cooperation and integration would be to 
negotiate preferentially with relevant groups of countries.78 Promoting regional parlia-
ments is of subsidiary importance at the present time since even national parliaments are 
relatively insignificant in the political decision-making process in Latin America.
6. Conclusion
There are good reasons to foster intensive contacts with all the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Only those who talk to each other can hope to be listened to and 
to exert a positive influence on each other. Only if the channels of communication are 
open, can Germany and the EU lobby for democracy, the rule of law and the upholding 
of human rights in the countries in question. We must take seriously the desire of our 
Latin American partners to have other points of contact in Europe in addition to Spain. 
Germany is well placed to be one of these contact points since we enjoy a high degree of 
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The subcontinent should in future be moved further up the political agenda in the Fede-
ral Republic. It is important to bear in mind in this context that China and India are two 
attractive trading partners on the other side of the Pacific who do not, for example, insist 
on adherence to social standards. We Europeans must counter this trend with our econo-
mic and social model promoting the idea of equal opportunity and solidarity. The model 
of European unification continues to be attractive to the region and offers a valuable 
point of reference for approaches to tackling structural asymmetries in Latin America.
There is scope for cooperation between Germany, the EU and Latin America in matters 
of environmental protection and in the three areas of security, power structures and pro-
sperity, whereby all are contingent on each other. Security is difficult to achieve without 
raising the level of prosperity. Democracy as a form of governance cannot be stabilised 
unless the security situation is improved. Further democratisation and the establishment 
of the rule of law are vital to improving the security situation and combating structural 
inequalities in Latin America. Cooperation on a partnership basis is crucial in all these 
areas. 
Germany can take on a leading role in consolidating democracy, reforming the consti-
tutional state and strengthening civil society. We can also provide assistance to Latin 
America in the area of social welfare. In the area of security there is scope for broad co-
operation between the EU and Latin America. It is important in the process to work on 
the basis of an expanded concept of security in which combating terrorism and the drugs 
trade, as well as environmental and resource protection, play an important role alongside 
crisis resolution and conflict prevention. International conflicts and environmental issues 
are risks which affect all countries in a globalised world.
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